Missouri Law Review
Volume 77
Issue 1 Winter 2012

Article 12

Winter 2012

Missouri's Foggy Fog Line Law
Charity Whitney

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Charity Whitney, Missouri's Foggy Fog Line Law, 77 MO. L. REV. (2012)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol77/iss1/12

This Notes and Law Summaries is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of
Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact bassettcw@missouri.edu.

Whitney: Whitney: Missouri's Foggy Fog Line Law

LAW SUMMARY
Missouri's Foggy Fog Line Law
CHARITY WHITNEY*

I.

INTRODUCTION

When told that crossing the fog line is not sufficient grounds for a traffic
stop in Missouri, most people will answer, "What is the fog line?" Though
the term may be unfamiliar to many, anyone who drives would recognize the
object to which it refers - the white or yellow line on the side of the road that
indicates the end of the lane and the beginning of the shoulder.' Fog lines
have been the subject of much civil and criminal litigation in Missouri, at
both the state and federal levels. 2 Crossing a fog line is a traffic violation for
failing to stay in the correct lane, and law enforcement officers have frequently initiated traffic stops based on such violations.3 Yet case law within Missouri has created a strange rule regarding crossing the fog line. Federal law
* B.A., Whitworth University, 2009; J.D. Candidate 2012, University of Missouri School of Law; Associate Managing Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2011-12. 1
owe many thanks to Casey Clevenger, of the Callaway County Prosecutor's Office,
without whom I never would have encountered the legal question addressed in this
Law Summary. Further, I would like to thank Professor Frank Bowman for his suggestions and assistance in writing this piece. Finally, thanks are due to Ian, my husband and intellectual springboard.
1. State v. KIempa, 235 S.W.3d 54, 58 n.2 (Mo. App. S.D. 2007).
2. See infra Part 11.
3. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 304.015 (Supp. 2010) ("All vehicles in motion upon a
highway having two or more lanes of traffic proceeding in the same direction shall be
driven in the right-hand lane except when overtaking and passing another vehicle or
when preparing to make a proper left turn or when otherwise directed by traffic markings, signs or signals. . . . Violation of this section shall be deemed a class C misde); see, e.g., United States v. Barry, No. 4:08CR405 CDP, 2009 WL
meanor ....
705965, at *6 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 16, 2009) ("[T]he car drove onto and across the fog line
on the road, which is a violation of Missouri vehicle law."); United States v. Wills,
No. 05-0014-01-CR-W-NKL, 2006 WL 2483210, at *4 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 25, 2006)
("[T]he vehicle's crossing of the fog line [is] a violation of Missouri traffic laws.");
State v. Collins, 72 S.W.3d 188, 195 (Mo. App. S.D. 2002) (stating that crossing the
center line and travelling on the highway shoulder "was a violation of state law for
failing to drive in the right-hand lane"). Where there has been any uncertainty about
whether this is a violation of law, the question has been whether driving on, but not
over, the fog line is a violation. See infra notes 35 & 55 and accompanying text. The
author of this Law Summary frequently refers to the act of crossing the fog line,
which is itself a law violation for failure to maintain a right hand lane, by the shorter
term "fog line violation."
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clearly states that any observation of a traffic law violation is sufficient for a
stop, 4 and Missouri case law has likewise held for many years that any traffic
law violation is sufficient cause for a law enforcement officer to initiate a
traffic stop. 5 However, Missouri courts have also insisted that crossing the
fog line is not sufficient cause to stop a vehicle.6 The combined effect of
these holdings puts Missouri state law in an internally inconsistent position how can courts insist that observing a law violation is not sufficient cause for
a law enforcement officer to reasonably suspect a law violation, and therefore
initiate a traffic stop?
The possible explanations for these holdings regarding fog line violations are many, but none are satisfactory. The Missouri Court of Appeals
may be trying to create a class of violations that are considered so minor that
a driver may not be stopped for them. Alternatively, the court may believe it
is acceptable to stop an individual for a fog line violation but it intends to
limit the offenses for which an officer may ticket that individual. 8 Finally,
the court may be making an analytical mistake by confusing reasonable suspicion of a lane violation with reasonable suspicion for other crimes, such as
driving while intoxicated. 9 No matter the explanation, the mere fact that Missouri's appellate court has taken this position regarding fog line violations has
a broader implication: the court has decided that failure to maintain a right
hand lane, a misdemeanor crime, is unenforceable if violated in the specific
manner of crossing the fog line. The Missouri Court of Appeals' fog line
rulings are at odds with federal courts' interpretation of Missouri law, and
possibly disregard precedent from the Supreme Court of Missouri with regard
to reasonable suspicion of fog line violations.' 0 Application of the appellate
court's pronounced fog line rule is confusing as a practical matter, and this
confusion makes guidance for law enforcement officers in this area unclear.I'
For these reasons, it is an anomaly in the law that deserves to be examined
and altered.

4. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996).
5. State v. Pike, 162 S.W.3d 464, 473 (Mo. 2005) (en banc) ("Reasonable suspicion - and therefore a traffic stop - may be based on the officer's observation of a
traffic violation." (citing State v. Barks, 128 S.W.3d 513, 516 (Mo. 2004) (en banc)));
Barks, 128 S.W.3d at 516 ("A routine traffic stop based on the violation of state traffic laws is a justifiable seizure under the Fourth Amendment." (citing State v. Slavin,
944 S.W.2d 314,317 (Mo. App. W.D. 1997))).
6. See, e.g., State v. Roark, 229 S.W.3d 216, 220-21 (Mo. App. W.D. 2007);
State v. Abeln, 136 S.W.3d 803, 812 (Mo. App. W.D. 2004).

7. See infra notes 131-35 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes
9. See infra notes
10. See infra notes
11. See infra notes

146-47 and accompanying text.
139-40 and accompanying text.
148-53, 166-69 and accompanying text.
154-65 and accompanying text.
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The "fog line" is the solid line that marks the end of the road and the beginning of the shoulder.12 Fog lines generally appear on both the left and
3
right sides of the roadway and are usually white or yellow in color.1 MiSsouri Revised Statutes section 304.015 makes driving on or over the fog line a
traffic violation.14 The pertinent part reads,
All vehicles in motion upon a highway having two or more lanes
of traffic proceeding in the same direction shall be driven in the
right-hand lane except when overtaking and passing another vehicle or when preparing to make a proper left turn or when otherwise
5
directed by traffic markings, signs or signals.'
Courts have interpreted this statute to mean that, unless one falls into an exception, failure to stay within the lines demarcating the right hand lane is a
violation of the statute.' 6 Under the statute, driving on or over the fog line, or
7
any other line demarcating the end of the lane, is a law violation.'
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and fifteenth
section of Article One of the Missouri Constitution protect against unreasonable searches and seizures.' 8 The Supreme Court of Missouri has stated that
"the Missouri Constitution provides the same guarantees against unreasonable
search and seizures" as the United States Constitution, and the analysis under
both is the same.' 9 It is a "seizure" for a law enforcement officer to stop a
vehicle, but such a stop is permissible if the officer has "reasonable suspicion" that a crime has occurred.20 Reasonable suspicion is a standard, more
than a hunch but considerably below preponderance of the evidence, which
justifies an officer's investigative stop of an individual upon the articulable
21,
and particularized belief that criminal activity is afoot. "In the traffic stop
12. Riche v. Dir. of Revenue, 987 S.W.2d 331, 333 (Mo. 1999) (en banc).
13. United States v. Delgado-Hemandez, 283 F. App'x 493, 494 (9th Cir. 2008);
United States v. Jones, 501 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1285 (D. Kan. 2007).
14. State v. Collins, 72 S.W.3d 188, 195 (Mo. App. S.D. 2002) (citing Mo. REV.
STAT. § 304.015.2 (2000)).
15. Mo. REV. STAT. § 304.015.6 (Supp. 2010).
16. See supra note 3.
17. Collins, 72 S.W.3d at 195. Driving over the center line is thus treated the
same as traversing the fog line, though this conduct is more accurately termed a "center line violation" rather than a "fog line violation." See infra notes 41, 43, 116 and
accompanying text.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Mo. CONST. art. I §, 15.
19. State v. Oliver, 293 S.W.3d 437, 442 (Mo. 2009) (en banc).
20. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 693, 696 (1996); State v. Franklin,
841 S.W.2d 639, 641 (Mo. 1992) (en banc).
21. Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 695-96.
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context, 'reasonable suspicion' is defined as a particularized and objective
basis for believing that the person being stopped is committing or did commit
a traffic violation and requires a lesser showing than probable cause."22 Observation of an actual traffic violation is enough for an officer to have reasonable suspicion.23 Probable cause is a standard more stringent than reasonable
suspicion.24 Probable cause "exist[s] where the known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief
that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found." 25
A. Missouri State Case Law
1. Fog Line Violations in Criminal Proceedings
In 2002, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Southern District decided
State v. Mendoza.26 In that case, a Missouri Highway Patrol sergeant observed a vehicle driving in the passing lane, though it was not passing any
other vehicle. 27 The vehicle was on, but not over, the yellow line of the left
shoulder.28 The sergeant stated that this manner of operation was not un29
safe. In determining whether the officer's observation warranted a stop, the
court quoted State v. Slavin, 30 stating that "' [a] police officer is authorized to
stop a vehicle observed violating the traffic laws of the state."' 3 Then, the
court mentioned the facts of several cases where traffic stops were justified
by "'unusual operation"' 32 of a vehicle, including one where the driver "abruptly dropped his speed by nearly twenty miles per hour when passing a
police officer,"33 and another in which the driver "was weaving erratically
within his lane of traffic." 34 However, the court held that the sergeant's stop
was unjustified because of the possibility that the driver "moved to the left

22. 68 AM. JUR. 2d Searches and Seizures § 89 (2011).
23. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996); State v. Pike, 162 S.W.3d

464, 473 (Mo. 2005).
24. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990); Pike, 162 S.W.3d at 473.
25. Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696; see Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
26. 75 S.W.3d 842 (Mo. App. S.D. 2002).
27. Id. at 845.
28. Id.
29. Id.

30. 944 S.W.2d 314 (Mo. App. W.D. 1997).
31. Mendoza, 75 S.W.3d at 845 (quoting Slavin, 944 S.W.2d at 317).
32. Id. at 845 (quoting State v. Malaney, 871 S.W.2d 634, 637 (Mo. App. S.D.

1994)).
33. Id. at 846 (citing State v. Bunts, 867 S.W.2d 277, 279-80 (Mo. App. S.D.
1993)).
34. Id. (citing Malaney, 871 S.W.2d at 635, 637-38).
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lane out of prudence," and because the statute did not "specifically proscribe"
the driver's actions.35
Following Mendoza were multiple Missouri appellate cases in which a
fog line violation was at least part of the reason for a traffic stop.36 First was
State v. Collins,37 in which an officer saw a truck driving on Highway 160
with its right tires on the fog line and following another vehicle too closely.38
The truck also "went off onto the shoulder and then corrected, causing the left
tires to cross over the center line," then "corrected the other way, going onto
the shoulder of the road." 39 Though the case revolved mainly around whether
the officer could make a stop outside of city limits, the court noted that following too closely on the highway is a class C misdemeanor, 40 and that crossing the center line and travelling on the highway shoulder "was a violation of
state law for failing to drive in the right-hand lane."A'
Second was State v. Belton,42 in which a Highway Patrol corporal witnessed a car on Interstate 70 "repeatedly cross the fog and center lines." 43
After turning on his emergency lights, but before the defendant's vehicle
stopped, the corporal also witnessed several plastic bags being thrown from
the car's window." Although the court did not specifically address the issue,
the court seemed to presume that the initial stop was valid based on the fog
line violation in addition to the driver's other suspicious conduct.45
After Collins and Belton, the Court of Appeals encountered cases where
the defendant did argue that a fog line violation was insufficient grounds for a
traffic stop. In State v. Abeln,46 the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District explicitly held that, even in addition to other circumstances,47 a
35. Id.
36. In the following cases, the defendants failed to argue that the fog line violation was insufficient grounds for a traffic stop. See infra notes 37-45 and accompanying text.
37. 72 S.W.3d 188 (Mo. App. S.D. 2002).

38. Id. at 190.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 195 (citing Mo. REV. STAT. § 304.017 (2000)).
41. Id. (citing Mo. REV. STAT. § 304.015.2).
42.

108 S.W.3d 171 (Mo. App. W.D. 2003).

43. Id. at 172.

44. Id. at 172-73.
id.

45. See

46. 136 S.W.3d 803 (Mo. App. W.D. 2004).
47. The State Trooper who initiated the traffic stop in Abeln was informed that
someone driving a burgundy pickup truck and wearing a tan coat had been seen in a
hardware store purchasing starter fluid after having bought funnels and hoses earlier
that week. Id. at 811-12. The Trooper saw Abein driving down the highway in a
burgundy pickup while wearing a tan coat, so the Trooper followed Abeln in his patrol vehicle. Id. at 812. From two cars behind Abeln, the Trooper claimed to see
Abeln "moving as if he were putting something into or taking something out of his
glove box," and also claimed to see the "passenger-side wheels of the truck twice
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driver's act of crossing the fog line twice "d[id] not add enough to the equation to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity" and therefore
was improper grounds for a traffic stop. 4 8 The court highlighted the fact that
the Trooper who conducted the traffic stop gave ambiguous testimony regarding "how far onto or beyond the fog line Respondent's tires went or how long
they remained there. "49 The court also noted that the Trooper did not immediately stop the defendant after observing the fog line violation.o
The dissent in this case made several points. First, the dissent noted that
traffic stops are "valid under the Fourth Amendment if . .. supported by reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot,"5 or if there is "probable
cause to believe a traffic violation, however, minor, has been committed." 52
Applying these rules to the facts of the case, the dissent stated that it was not
unreasonable to find "that the [defendant's] movements could lead an officer
to believe the driver was being inattentive. While inattentiveness may not
rise to the level of careless and imprudent driving outlined in the statute, it
could justify a stop and a warning by a law enforcement officer.,5 3 The dissent noted, referring to the license revocation case Riche v. Directorof Revenue,54 that "Missouri case law does not directly say whether a car's driving on
the fog line twice in a non-emergency situation justifies a traffic stop."55
Finally, the dissent pointed out the many other states and federal jurisdictions
that have held that fog line violations warrant a traffic stop. 56
travel[] over the fog line." Id. The Trooper ran a check on Abeln's license plate, and
remembered recently hearing that Abeln "was involved in local methamphetamine
trade" and may have been carrying a firearm. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 810 n.7.
50. Id. (citing for support State v. Mendoza, 75 S.W.3d 842, 845-46 (Mo. App.
S.D. 2002)).
51. Id. at 815 (Lowenstein, J., dissenting) (citing State v. West, 58 S.W.3d 563,
568 (Mo. App. W.D. 2001)).

52. Id. (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 813 (1996); State v.
Scott, 926 S.W.2d 864, 870-71 (Mo. App. S.D. 1996)).
53. Id. at 817.
54. 987 S.W.2d 331 (Mo. 1999) (en banc).

55. Abeln, 136 S.W.3d at 816 (Lowenstein, J., dissenting) ("The Court did not
address whether the car's crossing the fog line twice gave the officer probable cause
to stop Riche, since the Director never raised the issue on appeal. In any event, the
Court held that for purposes of driver's license revocation hearings it is untrue that the
initial stop of a motorist must be supported by probable cause. Thus, whether there
was probable cause to stop Riche was a moot issue, at most, then even any implicit
approval of the trial court's conclusion was dicta." (emphasis added) (citing Riche,

987 S.W.2d at 336) (internal citation omitted)). After this, the dissent distinguished
Mendoza, upon which the majority relied. Id. at 817 ("The Southern District did not
opine on whether a car's crossing the yellow line (or the fog line) gives an officer
probable cause or reasonable suspicion to make a traffic stop.").
56. Id. at 817.
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57
In 2005, the Supreme Court of Missouri decided State v. Pike. In that
case, a Highway Patrol Trooper observed the defendant's vehicle cross the
fog line twice, "by as much as one foot" each time.5 8 As a result, the defendant was driving partially on the shoulder of the road. 59 The court noted that
the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a traffic stop may be based on
observation of a traffic violation or on erratic or unusual driving. The court
highlighted that the incident took place at 2:20 a.m., that the defendant was
following another vehicle at only one car length, that there was no circumstance that necessitated the defendant's fog line violations, and the Trooper's
experience as a Highway Patrol officer.61 Therefore, the court held that the
evidence supported the trial court's finding that "[t]he stop was constitutionally permissible." 62 The court further noted "that the [T]rooper could point to
specific facts - the distance between the vehicles and the transgressions over
the fog line - that provided a reasonable suspicion that Pike had committed at
least one traffic violation." 63
Two years later, the Missouri Court of Appeals Western District decided
State v. Roark,64 in which the defendant, driving in heavy traffic, crossed the
65
fog line twice with his passenger-side tires. The court stated that the "only
articulable fact" to support reasonable suspicion was the fog line "transgression," and it concluded that because no other cars "took evasive action to
avoid Roark's car" there was no evidence that "Roark was driving erratically
or in a dangerous manner."66 The court rejected a comparison to Abeln, stating that "the similarities between the present case and Abeln are of no great
import," because the Roark court's review was "conducted in light of the
totality of the circumstances."67 Citing Pike to support this standard of review, the court stated parenthetically that Pike "not[ed] that reasonable suspicion may be based on erratic or unusual driving."68 Based on these findings,
the court ruled that the trial court's decision was "clearly erroneous" and that
the officer did not have reasonable suspicion upon which to stop the defendant.

57. 162 S.W.3d 464 (Mo. 2005) (en banc).
58. Id. at 468.
59. Id.

60. See id at 473.
6 1. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. 229 S.W.3d 216 (Mo. App. W.D. 2007).
65. Id. at 217.

66. Id. at 220-21.
67. Id. at 222.
68. Id. (citing Pike, 162 S.W.3d 464).
69. Id.
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In State v. Loyd,70 the Western District affirmed its holding that fog line
violations are insufficient grounds for traffic stops. 7 1 In Loyd, the defendant's
car drove upon, but did not cross, the white dividing line between lanes while
72
turning a corner. The court stated that video from the officer's dashboard
mounted camera "clearly establishe[d] that there was no illegal or unusual
driving in th[at] case." 73 The defendant was not swerving, speeding, or driving erratically before being stopped by the officer, and the court held that the
fog line violation was, on its own, "an insufficient basis to provide the police
74
probable cause to conduct a traffic stop."
2. Fog Line Violations in Civil License Revocation Proceedings
Fog line violations appear in many license revocation cases; however,
revocation cases are different from criminal cases in several respects. The
case of Jones v. DirectorofRevenue75 explains the primary difference, stating
that whether an officer "had a reasonable suspicion for a lawful stop is irrelevant in a civil driver's license revocation proceeding." 76 This is because only
three issues exist in such a proceeding: "(1) whether or not the person was
arrested or stopped; (2) whether the officer had reasonable grounds to believe
that the person was driving a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated or
drugged condition; and (3) whether or not the person refused to submit to the
[breath] test." 77 Though a person "'has a statutory right to refuse chemical
analysis of his blood alcohol level,"' the Director of Revenue will revoke that
person's driver's license for one year for refusing to take the breath test .'[i]f
the arresting officer ha[d] reasonable grounds to believe that the person was
driving while intoxicated.' 78 In Riche v. DirectorofRevenue,79 the Supreme
Court of Missouri held that the probable cause requirement for traffic stops,
and thus the exclusionary rule as well, does not apply in section 302.505 proceedings for license revocations.80
70. 326 S.W.3d 908 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010).
71. Id. at 915-16.

72. Id. at 915.
73. Id.

74. Id. The court in Loyd only discussed the Pike decision in relation to the
standard for review. Id. at 911.
75. 291 S.W.3d 340 (Mo. App. S.D. 2009).
76. Id. at 344.
77. Id. at 343 (citing Mo. REV. STAT. § 577.041.4 (2000)).
78. Id. (quoting Hinnah v. Dir. of Revenue, 77 S.W.3d 616, 619-20 (Mo. 2002)
(en banc)).
79. 987 S.W.2d 331 (Mo. 1999) (en banc).
80. Id. at 336. The court wrote:
[e]xtending the exclusionary rule to section 302.505 proceedings would
unnecessarily complicate and burden an administrative process designed
to remove drunken drivers from Missouri's roads and highways as quickly
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3. Unusual Operation
Cases dealing with fog line violations are closely related to cases that
8
more generally discuss unusual operation of a vehicle. ' The first notable
case discussing unusual operation is State v. Marshell.82 In that case, a motor
83
The Mishome was pulled over for drifting back and forth within its lane.
souri Court of Appeals for the Southern District found that these circumstances were sufficient to justify the traffic stop, as the sergeant "questioned
84
whether the operator [of the motor home] was sleepy or intoxicated."
Other cases, such as State v. Huckin, affirm that it is permissible to conIn that
a
duct traffic stop after seeing a vehicle weave within its own lane.
times
four
shoulder
the
and
line
center
the
between
case, the vehicle drifted
87
officer
an
v.
Malaney,
State
case,
In another such
before being stopped.
pulled over the defendant after observing the vehicle weave toward the center
lane and then correct its course." On appeal, the defendant argued that there
89
was not probable cause for the officer to stop the vehicle. The court found
that "' [w]eaving within the lane of traffic in which a vehicle is traveling pro90
In
vides a sufficient basis for an investigatory stop of a motor vehicle."'

as possible. In addition, application of the exclusionary rule would preclude consideration of probative, reliable evidence and would allow many
drivers to remain on the road who would otherwise lose their licenses. . . .
Imposing the exclusionary rule in civil license revocation and suspension
proceedings would have little force in deterring unlawful police action,
because the director of revenue has no control over the actions of local police officers.
Id. at 334-35 (internal citations omitted).
81. There is no statute in Missouri specifically addressing unusual operation of a
vehicle, erratic driving, or weaving; if such activities were to be pursued with a criminal charge, it is most likely that they would be considered careless and imprudent
driving under section 304.012. That section reads:
Every person operating a motor vehicle on the roads and highways of this
state shall drive the vehicle in a careful and prudent manner and at a rate
of speed so as not to endanger the property of another or the life or limb of
any person and shall exercise the highest degree of care.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 304.012.1 (2000).
82. 825 S.W.2d 341 (Mo. App. S.D. 1992).
83. Id. at 342.
84. Id. at 347.
85. 847 S.W.2d 951, 955 (Mo. App. S.D. 1993).
86. Id.
87. 871 S.W.2d 634 (Mo. App. S.D. 1994).
88. Id. at 635.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 637 (quoting People v. Loucks, 481 N.E.2d 1086, 1087 (111. App. Ct.
1985)).
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State v. Hernandez,91 the court also upheld the stop of a vehicle that had
weaved into the next lane of traffic. 92
B. FederalCase Law
Law within the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit regarding the permissibility of traffic stops based on fog line violations differs
from Missouri's. The first notable case from the Eighth Circuit that dealt
with the federal interpretations of state law on this topic is United States v.
Pulliam.93 In that case, the defendant drifted onto the fog line twice in two
miles, which was a violation of an Arkansas law 94 that required a vehicle to
be driven within a single lane.95 In determining whether the traffic stop was
justified by the fog line violation, the court wrote, "It is well-established that
a traffic violation, however minor, creates probable cause to stop the driver of
a vehicle," adding later that "even under a strict construction, [the officer] had
him dead to rights for a traffic violation." 96 To support its holding, the court
97
cited Eighth and Tenth Circuit precedent.
In United States v. Herrera-Gonzalez,98 the Eighth Circuit dealt with a
driver who crossed the fog line for ten to fifteen seconds while traveling near
multiple tow trucks.99 Looking at the full circumstances of the incident, the
court considered the possibility that the driver was crossing the fog line for
safety reasons, but decided that the facts gave the officer an "objectively reasonable basis to believe that a violation of the Iowa statute had occurred."10 0
Federal District Court cases interpreting Missouri law have reached a
similar conclusion when examining suspicious driving conduct that included
fog line violations. In United States v. Sanchez-Guevara, o0 a defendant argued that driving on the fog line was not a traffic violation under Missouri
law.'o2 The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri
91. 880 S.W.2d 336 (Mo. App. W.D. 1994).
92. Id. at 337-38.
93. 265 F.3d 736 (8th Cir. 2001).
94. Id. at 739; ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-51-302(1) (LEXIS through 2011 Reg. Sess.
and updates) ("A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practical entirely within a single
lane and shall not be moved from the lane until the driver has first ascertained that
movement can be made with safety. . .
95. See Pulliam, 265 F.3d at 739.
96. Id.
97. Id. (citing United States v. Ozbirn, 189 F.3d 1194, 1198 (10th Cir. 1999);
United States v. Barberena-Jimenez, No. 95-3202, 1996 WL 83002, at *2 (8th Cir.

Feb. 28, 1996)).
98. 474 F.3d 1105 (8th Cir. 2007).
99. Id at 1110-11.
100. Id.

101. No. 05-03059, 2005 WL 2649493 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 17, 2005).
102. Id at *1.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol77/iss1/12

10

Whitney: Whitney: Missouri's Foggy Fog Line Law

2012]

MISSOURI'S FOGGY FOG LINE LAW

313

affirmed Pulliam'sholding and found against the defendant, adding that "so
long as police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred, the stop is valid even if the police would have ignored the traffic violation but for their suspicion that greater crimes [were] afoot." 0 3 The court
also noted, with the uncertain wording of the statute in mind, that it is reasonable for an objective officer to find that driving on the fog line is a traffic
violation sufficient for a stop.'
Responding to the defendant's reliance on
the Missouri Court of Appeals cases of Abeln and Mendoza, the court stated
that "none of these cases dispositively state whether merely driving onto, but
05
not over the line was a violation, leaving the issue open for interpretation."'
Finally, the court noted that the officer had stated that in his experience, fog
line violations could possibly indicate drunken, tired, or impaired driving, and
the court stated that it found the officer persuasive on this point. o0
The defendant in United States v. Gray, decided by the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, drove his pickup beyond a
stop sign and swerved outside of the fog line.107 The court approved of the
traffic stop and unequivocally stated that "[t]he case law is clear: When a
violation - however minor - he has probable
police officer observes a traffic
08
vehicle."'
the
stop
to
cause
In UnitedStates v. Wills, decided by the United States District Court for
the Western District of Missouri, an officer saw a vehicle drift across the fog
The defendant argued that there were
line and pulled it over accordingly.
insufficient grounds for the stop, but the court held that the officer "had the
requisite reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle that he believed was being
operated in a careless and dangerous manner, as evidenced, in part, by0 the
vehicle's crossing of the fog line- a violation of Missouri traffic laws.""
In United States v. Barry,"' the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Missouri held that crossing the fog line is a violation of
Missouri traffic law, and thus is lawful grounds for stopping a vehicle.112

103. Id.
104. Id. at *2.
105. Id. Pike is not mentioned in the opinion. See id.
106. Id.
107. United States v. Gray, No. 4:06CR00160 SNL(AGF), 2006 WL 1523012, at
*3 (E.D. Mo. May 30, 2006), report and recommendation adopted, No. 4:06CR160

SNL(AGF), 2006 WL 1888544 (E.D. Mo. July 7, 2006).
108. Id. (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996)). The court cited
Pike for the contention that 'transgressions over the fog line' provide reasonable
suspicion to believe [a] traffic violation occurred." Id. at *4.
109. United States v. Wills, No. 05-0014-01-CR-W-NKL, 2006 WL 2483210, at
*2 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 25, 2006).
110. Wills, 2006 WL 2483210, at *4.
111. No. 4:08CR406CDP, 2009 WL 705965 (E.D. Mo. March 16,2009).

112. Id at *7.
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They held that this is so, regardless of the officers' subjective suspicions of
greater crimes." 3
Another Eastern District case, United States v. Del Real,"4 held that a
defendant travelling over the fog line is sufficient grounds for a traffic stop." 5
The defendant's vehicle in that case "travel[led] over the fog line onto the
shoulder," then "weaved onto the center line from the right lane.""6 The
court found that the defendant's act of driving on the center line, and not driving in the right hand lane, gave the officer probable cause to stop the vehicle.' 17

III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The Missouri Court of Appeals has continued to write decisions that affect this area of law. Recently, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Southern District decided a case involving fog line violations as the unusual operation of a vehicle."i 8 In State v. Brown, the defendant asserted that driving on
the center dividing line was not a traffic violation, which the State did not
challenge.' 19 Instead, the State argued that the deputy initiated the traffic stop
because the center line violation was accompanied by weaving within a single
lane, which was an unusual operation.120 Citing both Malaneyl21 and
Huckin,122 the court found that the officer's stop was proper.123 The court
also cited Pike to support the proposition that "erratic or unusual operation"
of a vehicle is grounds for stop, relegating mention of that case's discussion
of fog line violations to a footnote.l 4 The court dismissed the defendant's
reliance on Abeln and Mendoza, finding that Abeln turned on a stipulation

113. See id.

114. No. 1:1OCR 52 SNLJ (LMB), 2010 WL 3258608 (E.D. Mo. July 30, 2010),
report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:10CRO00 52 SNLJ, 2010 WL 3258610
(E.D. Mo. Aug. 16, 2010).
115. Id. at *2.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. State v. Brown, 332 S.W.3d 282, 285-87 (Mo. App. S.D. 2011).
119. Id. at 285. See supra note 17 and accompanying text for the lack of legal
distinction between crossing the fog line and crossing the center line.
120. Brown, 332 S.W.3d at 285.
121. State v. Malaney, 871 S.W.2d 634, 635, 638 (Mo. App. S.D. 1994) (noting

that a vehicle that weaved toward the center lane and then corrected course was
stopped permissibly).

122. State v. Huckin, 847 S.W.2d 951, 955 (Mo. App. S.D. 1993) (noting that a
vehicle that drifted between the center line and the shoulder four times was stopped
permissibly).

123. Brown, 332 S.W.3d at 287.
124. Id. at 285 & n.5.
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issue, and that the driving in Mendoza could be explained as avoidance of
vehicles on the other side of the road. 125
The court then discussed the "community caretaking" function of law
enforcement, namely that "a law enforcement officer may approach a vehicle
for safety reasons, or if a motorist needs assistance, so long as the officer can
point to reasonable, articulable facts upon which to base his actions."' 26 The
court likened the case at bar to Malaney and Huckin in that all of the officers
testified that they "wanted to find out whether fatigue, illness or impairment
accounted for Defendant's erratic driving." 27
IV. DISCUSSION
In State v. Abeln, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District
wrote: "Articulating precisely what 'reasonable suspicion' and 'probable
cause' mean is not possible. They are commonplace, nontechnical conceptions that deal with 'the factual and practical consideration of everyday life on
which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.'" 28 After stating this, the court proceeded to articulate a specific action that is not, on its
own, sufficient for reasonable suspicion: a fog line violation.129 Missounis
appellate court rulings regarding fog line violations are a cause for discussion
in several respects. It seems that, to at least some extent, the court is stating
that the law violation of failing to maintain a lane is unenforceable if it is
based on a driver crossing the fog line. What are the court's reasons for deciding this? What are the practical implications of the court's reasoning, as
well as the implications of the fog line rule in light of the larger body of Missouri law?
Crossing the fog line is a violation of Missouri law, punishable as a
Class C misdemeanor. 30 Since this particular driving conduct is a law violation, is Missouri's appellate court really saying that one cannot be pulled over
and ticketed for violating the law in this particular way?
It is possible that the court is trying to say that there is an undefined
class of law violations that are so minor that one cannot be stopped for such a
violation. Perhaps if the statute defined the transgression as an infraction, this
would be logical the on part of the court. However, the statute clearly makes
the driving conduct of failing to maintain a right hand lane a misdemeanor
law violation.'31 Logic shows that "reasonable suspicion of a law violation"

125. Id. at 286.
126. Id. at 287.
127. Id.

128. State v. Abeln, 136 S.W.3d 803, 816 (Mo. App. W.D. 2004) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996)).
129. See id. at 812.
130. Mo. REV. STAT. § 304.015 (Supp. 2010).
13 1. Id.
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does not, by its own terms, mean "reasonable suspicion of a particularly bad
law violation." Yet, that seems to be what the appellate court wishes it to
mean, as it continuously makes statements such as: there was no evidence of
"driving erratically or in a dangerous manner,"'32 or, the driver "was not
swerving; wasn't driving erratically; wasn't speeding; wasn't about to strike
anything."' 33 Simply because one can point to the lack of danger in a particular traffic violation does not negate the fact that it is, in fact, a violation of
law. It almost seems as though the court dismisses the fact that failure to
maintain a right hand lane is a law violation and instead presumes that the
State must show careless and imprudent drivingl 34 on the part of the defendant in order to justify a stop. The court has even called fog line violations
"transgressions," 35 perhaps to avoid the contradictory legal holding that observing a fog line violation is not enough for an officer to have reasonable
suspicion of a law violation. Simply put, the Missouri appellate court's rule
that observation of a crime (if it is a fog line violation) is not enough for reasonable suspicion of criminal activity is bizarre.
An example of the application of this strange rule can be seen in the
comparison between Abeln and Pike. The comparison demonstrates that if an
officer is articulate in his claim that a fog line violation is enough for reasonable suspicion, it is more likely to be favored. Where in Abeln the Missouri
Court of Appeals for the Western District pointed out the lack of specific
details in a Trooper's testimony about the fog line, the Supreme Court of
Missouri in Pike commended a Trooper for stating the time of the incident,
the distance crossed beyond the fog line, and deferred to the Trooper's experience.137 Whether the Abeln fog line violation was drastically different from
the Pike fog line violation is unknown; it was the recall of specific facts that
made a difference to the courts. However, in both cases the only absolutely
essential fact regarding the lane violation was the same: the vehicles crossed
the fog line while driving.13 8 While the time, weather, surrounding traffic,
and other details are relevant to a traffic case, they do not alter the simple fact
that a law violation occurred.
Another possibility for the court's holdings is that Missouri's appellate
court is confusing the issue of whether a solitary fog line violation is sufficient for reasonable suspicion of driving drunk (or another crime), and the
issue of whether a fog line violation is sufficient for reasonable suspicion of a
moving violation. This confusion may stem from the fact that reasonable
suspicion for a moving violation based on crossing the fog line in many cases
132. See, e.g., State v. Roark, 229 S.W.3d 216, 221 (Mo. App. W.D. 2007).
133. See, e.g., State v. Loyd, 326 S.W.3d 908, 915 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010) (inter-

nal quotation marks omitted).
134. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 304.012 (2000).
135. State v. Pike, 162 S.W.3d 464, 473 (Mo. 2005) (en banc).
136. See State v. Abeln, 136 S.W.3d 803, 809 (Mo. App. W.D. 2004).
137. See Pike, 162 S.W.3d at 473.

138. See id. at 486; Abeln, 136 S.W.3d at 817.
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leads to the discovery of circumstances that raise suspicion of driving while
intoxicated or other crimes. This would explain why the court seems concerned with evidence of the defendant "driving erratically or in a dangerous
manner,"139 swerving, speeding, or being about to strike an object.140 To say
that driving across the fog line is not sufficient for an officer to have reasonable suspicion that a driver is intoxicated seems logical enough. Yet, repeatedly finding that a fog line violation is not sufficient grounds for reasonable
suspicion at all means that the court is holding that officers may not pull a
driver over for an observed violation of law. If officers are unable to stop a
vehicle for a lane violation based on crossing the fog line, how can this law
be enforced?
Perhaps Missouri courts are concerned that stops based on fog line violations are pre-textual in nature. Under the United States Constitution, however, there is no question that pre-textual stops are permissible.141 In so far as
federal law is concerned, stopping a vehicle for a lane violation while pretextually looking for evidence of intoxication is legal; if there is a law violation, officers may stop a vehicle, period.142 The Missouri appellate court
could perhaps rely on the state's constitution to challenge the validity of these
pre-textual stops, yet none of the fog line cases analyzed the issue through the
lens of state constitutionality.143 Further, the Supreme Court of Missouri has
held, like the United States Supreme Court, that an officer's subjective motives or possible pretext are irrelevant as long as "the police do no more than
they are objectively authorized and legally permitted to do."'" It is very odd,
then, for Missouri's appellate court to single out fog line crossing for different treatment than any other driving behavior that might lead to pre-textual
stops.145
There is another, final, possible explanation for what Missouri's court of
appeals has held in its cases. Maybe the court believes that there are some
law violations that are so minor that after being stopped for such a violation,
the only thing an officer may permissibly do is ticket the driver for that viola-

139. State v. Roark, 229 S.W.3d 216, 221 (Mo. App. W.D. 2007).
140. State v. Loyd, 326 S.W.3d 908, 915 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010).
141. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812-13 (1996).
142. See id. at 819.
143. See supra Part ll.A.
144. State v. Mease, 842 S.W.2d 98, 105-06 (Mo. 1992) (en banc) (citing United
States v. Cummins, 920 F.2d 498, 501 (8th Cir. 1990)).
145. The Missouri Court of Appeals' unusual operation cases (discussed supra
Part II.A.3) came before the 1996 Whren decision, further mystifying the court's

thought process. The unusual operation cases allow officers to stop vehicles in situations where there is no observed violation of law. See supra Part II.A.3. If the Court
of Appeals were concerned about stops for fog line violations being pre-textual in
nature, why would they have given officers such wide discretion in unusual operations cases before pre-textual stops were even declared constitutional?
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tion.146 This approach could explain cases like Loyd, where the officer pulled
over a driver and despite clear signs of the driver's intoxication, the court
precluded the introduction of that evidence because the initial stop was based
on a fog line violation.14 7 The problem with this approach is obvious: under
this interpretation, an officer could pull over a vehicle for crossing the fog
line, approach that vehicle, see dead bodies lying in the backseat of the car,
but could only proceed to write the driver a ticket for failure to maintain a
right hand lane. This evidence of a much more serious crime is legally indistinguishable from evidence of intoxication. To the author's knowledge, there
is no other legal scheme in the country that would thusly restrict an officer to
acting only upon their initial observation and force them to disregard anything else seen.
No matter whether the Missouri Court of Appeals fashioned its rule regarding fog line crossings out of fear of pre-textual stops, confusion of multiple reasonable suspicion standards, or some other reason, the effect is the
same: the court has attempted to make the class C misdemeanor of failure to
maintain a right hand lane unenforceable if committed by means of crossing
the fog line. The mere notion that the court may so seriously undermine a
criminal statute passed by the legislature is unnerving; additionally, it is possible that the Missouri Court of Appeals has disregarded the Supreme Court
of Missouri's own ruling on this issue. Besides these intellectual concerns,
though, is also the uneasiness caused by the practical effects of what the court
has ruled.
Pike is the only fog line case decided by the Supreme Court of Missouri
In Pike, the defendant
in which the validity of the traffic stop was at issue.
followed another vehicle too closely and crossed the fog line twice, and the
court found that the defendant had committed "at least one traffic violation,"
making the stop permissible.149 The court did not say whether it was the fog
line violations or the act of following too closely that was the traffic violation

146. Under this construct, the purpose would basically have to be to eliminate the
plain-view exception and the other existing legal means of using this particular type
of initial stop to gather evidence about any other sort of law violation. Otherwise,
cases such as Loyd would be irreconcilable. See generally State v. Loyd, 326 S.W.3d
908 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010).
147. See id. at 912, 915.
148. See State v. Pike, 162 S.W.3d 464, 473 (Mo. 2005) (en banc); supra notes
57-63 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court of Missouri mentioned the fog
line while reciting the facts of one other case. Walker v. Dir. of Revenue, 137 S.W.3d
444 (Mo. 2004) (en banc) (per curiam). In that case, the defendant was stopped after
"swerving, crossing the centerline, and driving on the fog line." Id. at 446. Though
the defendant in that case challenged whether there was probable cause for his arrest,
he did not challenge the validity of the initial stop and the Supreme Court of Missouri
accordingly did not discuss it either. See id. at 446-47.
149. Pike, 162 S.W.3d at 473.
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to which it was referring.150 It is arguable that this implies that both acts were
violative; because it did not matter which violation it was, either one was
sufficient for reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle.' 5 Despite this ruling
seven years ago, the Missouri Court of Appeals has failed to even discuss the
possibility that Pike is controlling on this issue of fog line violations. 152Instead, the Court of Appeals has continued to hold fog line violations insufficient to stop a vehicle.
There are troubling implications when one examines the practical application of the fog line rule in the context of the greater body of Missouri law.
In Missouri, a traffic stop can result in multiple types of legal proceedings if a
5
law violation is discovered.154 As discussed previously,'1 there is a difference between license revocation cases, civil proceedings initiated by the Director of Revenue, and criminal traffic cases initiated by the appropriate prosecuting authority. Missouri Revised Statutes section 302.505 states: "The
department shall suspend or revoke the license of any person upon its determination that the person was arrested upon probable cause to believe such
person was driving a motor vehicle while the alcohol concentration in the
person's blood, breath, or urine was eight-hundredths of one percent or more .
. . .,156 Because there is no requirement that the initialstop be based on reasonable suspicion, only that the arrest of the person be based on probable
57
cause, whether a person did more than cross the fog line is immaterial.1
This leads to an inconsistency: an officer can stop a driver for a fog line violation, discover that the driver is intoxicated over the .08 blood alcohol content level, arrest him, and revoke his license for driving while intoxicated.
However, the exact same driver cannot be convicted criminally of driving
while intoxicated, due to the fact that the appellate court has decided that fog
line violations are not "enough" of a law violation to warrant reasonable suspicion for stopping him in the first place. ' To the average citizen, it is confusing that a person can simultaneously have his license revoked for driving
while intoxicated but be found criminally not guilty of driving while intoxicated.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See supra Part II.A.
153. See, e.g., State v. Loyd, 326 S.W.3d 908, 915 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010); State
v. Roark, 229 S.W.3d 216, 217, 222 (Mo. App. W.D. 2007). Though the Supreme
Court of Missouri did not explicitly make a statement on the fog line rule, it is still
notable that the appellate court did not seem to change its approach to this issue at all
after Pike was announced. See supra Part II.A.l. One would hope that the appellate
court would at least address Pike in order to harmonize that case with its own rulings.
154. See supra Part II.A.
155. Supra Part Il.A.
156. Mo. REV. STAT. § 302.505.1 (Supp. 2010).
157. See Jones v. Dir. of Revenue, 291 S.W.3d 340, 344 (Mo. App. S.D. 2009).
158. See supra notes 46-50, 64-74 and accompanying text.
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The thrust of the fog line case law in Missouri is also at odds with the
principle of "unusual operation" cases. None of Missouri's courts have explained why crossing the fog line is different from actions that are deemed
unusual operations. Cases like Marshell,9 Huckin,160 and Malaney16 have
all upheld traffic stops based on a vehicle weaving within its own lane.162 it
is worth noting that weaving within a lane of traffic without failing to remain
It is
in that lane is not necessarily a violation of Missouri's traffic laws.1
peculiar that a non-violation is sufficient to find reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, but an actual violation of law is not sufficient to make the same
finding. This incongruous set of holdings could be interpreted to mean that if
a car weaves within its own lane it may be stopped with reasonable suspicion,
yet if the same car drives in an identical fashion a few feet to the right, across
the fog line, it may not be stopped with reasonable suspicion.'" Both situations indicate similar levels of inattentive driving, yet where an actual lane
violation has occurred, a traffic stop would either be lacking reasonable suspicion, or the officer would have to point to factors in addition to the fog line
violation to make the stop permissible. If the appellate court fears that officers will abuse their discretion if they are granted leeway to stop vehicles for a
mere fog line crossing, then why would the court not likewise fear officers'
ability to stop vehicles for weaving within a lane?165 If the court is concerned
that officers are not giving sufficiently detailed explanations to support reasonable suspicion, then why would the court not require additional factors for
in-lane weaving the way it does for fog line crossings?
159. State v. Marshell, 825 S.W.2d 341, 342, 347 (Mo. App. S.D. 1992) (motor
home that drifted back and forth within its lane was stopped permissibly).
160. State v. Huckin, 847 S.W.2d 951, 955 (Mo. App. S.D. 1993) (vehicle that
drifted between the center line and the shoulder four times was stopped permissibly).
161. State v. Malaney, 871 S.W.2d 634, 635 (Mo. App. S.D. 1994) (vehicle that
weaved toward the center lane and then corrected course was stopped permissibly).
162. Id. at 635, 637; Huckin, 847 S.W.2d at 955; Marshell, 825 S.W.2d at 342,
347.

163. See Mo.

REV. STAT.

§ 304.015 (2000).

164. Compare State v. Roark, 229 S.W.3d 216, 217, 222 (Mo. App. W.D. 2007)
(vehicle crossed over fog line twice, insufficient for reasonable suspicion), with
Huckin, 847 S.W.2d at 955 (vehicle weaved towards line four times but corrected
course, sufficient for reasonable suspicion).
165. The incongruity compounds if one considers that Missouri courts have also
affirmed that law enforcement officers have a legitimate community caretaking function under which a law enforcement officer, even with no suspicion of criminal activity, "may approach a vehicle for safety reasons, or if a motorist needs assistance, so
long as the officer can point to reasonable, articulable facts upon which to base his
actions." State v. Schroeder, 330 S.W.3d 468, 473 (Mo. 2011) (en banc). Does this
mean that if an officer articulates that he believed a driver's fog line violations were
indicative of said driver having a health problem, or some other need of assistance,
that the stop would then be found permissible? What if such a stop yielded proof of
driving while intoxicated?
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Finally, the lack of consistency regarding fog line violations is not limited to applications of state law. Because the Eighth Circuit has found that
any traffic violation is sufficient cause for a traffic stop,16 Missouri's rulings
on this issue are at odds with federal rulings. It is not uncommon for state
and federal laws to differ on similar subject matters.' 67 However, this incongruity leads to a strange result. If an officer pulls over a vehicle for a fog line
crossing and subsequently finds evidence that the driver committed a federal
crime, this evidence will not be barred because of the nature of the stop. On
the other hand, if the officer finds evidence that the driver committed a state
crime, the evidence will likely be excluded. Perhaps this would not offend
common sense if all federal crimes were more serious than state crimes; however, this is not the case. A man caught with an illegally imported lobster in
the front seat of his car may be guilty of a federal crime,' and if stopped for
crossing the fog line, charges may be brought. On the other hand, a man
caught with a bloody knife and several dead bodies in the backseat of his car
could not have that evidence brought against him if he was stopped for a fog
line violation, because murder is a state crime.
Aside from the disparity of
culpability in this fanciful situation, the obvious problem is that a law enforcement officer on routine patrol can almost never know beforehand whether the driver of the car he observes making a traffic violation will be caught
committing a federal or state crime, if any other crime at all, when stopped.
With this discrepancy between how federal and state courts in Missouri
view the fog line violation, how can law enforcement officers know how to
conform their conduct to the law? Similarly, how can the court tell officers
that the standard they are expected to meet when stopping a vehicle is "reasonable suspicion of criminal activity" and also tell officers that certain
crimes (such as failure to maintain one's lane) are not sufficient to meet that
standard? The confusion this creates is most likely not remedied by officers
166. See supra Part II.B.
167. For example, Missouri's ban on "retrospective" law is broader than the United States Constitution's ban on ex post facto laws, which affects statutes restricting
sex offenders. See Lauren Standlee, The Current State of Retrospective Laws as Applied to Missouri Sex Offenders, 66 J. Mo. B. 256, 260 (2010). Washington law also
differs dramatically from federal law, as pre-textual traffic stops are impermissible in
that state. See Kelly Montgomery, Note, Leaving Well Enough Alone - Why the
"Would Have" Standard Works Well for Determining Pretext Stops in Washington
State: A CriticalAnalysis of the Whren Decision, 21 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 159, 161
(1997).
168. The man might be charged with violating the Lacey Act. 16 U.S.C. §§ 337178 (2006). Illegal lobsters are not an original hypothetical of this author. See James
Duane, Don't Talk to the Police, REGENT U. SCH. LAW (Mar. 14, 2008),
http://www.regent.edu/acad/schlaw/faculty staff/duane.cfm#police.
169. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.020 (2000). The plain view exception would
make no difference in this case. State v. Miller, 894 S.W.2d 649, 656 (Mo. 1995) (en
banc) (plain view doctrine is inapplicable where initial stop is illegal); see also Horton
v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 135-37 (1990).
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refusing to pull over drivers for fog line violations; rather, prosecutors probably encourage officers to recall other specific "factors" that can emphasize
that the case is one of "unusual operation" instead of "fog line transgression."
Instead of encouraging officers, Troopers, and prosecutors to bend the facts to
satisfy the court's nonsensical rulings, Missouri courts should make a clear
ruling that is consistent with the meaning of "reasonable suspicion."
For prosecutors and law enforcement officers, there is simple and practical advice for how to deal with this imperfect case law. Prosecutors who
desire to maintain that a stop based on a fog line violation is valid have multiple avenues open to them. First, they can gather more details from the law
enforcement officer that articulate why the fog line violation was dangerous
or unusual, thus necessitating a traffic stop.o70 Second, they may elect to
characterize the stop as based on "unusual operation" rather than a fog line
violation, and thus meet only the lower burden from that line of cases. Either
avenue requires the use of additional articulated details beyond the mere fact
that the driver crossed the fog line. Such facts could include those mentioned
in the discussed cases, like time of day, weather, and traffic patterns. It may
also be helpful for the officer to describe the lack of certain factors, for example, that there was no obstacle in the road necessitating the driver to leave
their lane and cross onto the shoulder. With the advent of many officers having video cameras attached to their vehicles, identifying such details should
pose no need for fabrication or exaggeration if the defendant-driver truly did
cross the fog line without an adequate reason.
V. CONCLUSION
The current case law in Missouri regarding fog line violations, created
by the Missouri Court of Appeals, is a contradictory mess. It lacks internal
consistency, lacks consistency with federal standards, and defies common
sense. Even worse, by insisting that a vehicle may not be pulled over for a
fog line violation, the appellate court appears to be attempting to write Missouri's lane violation statute out of the books. The court's opinions on the
fog line issue may seem too minor to warrant attention, yet they have a
broader implication: Missouri's appellate court seems to feel comfortable
saying that certain misdemeanor crimes are unenforceable. Even if one is not
concerned with the fog line rulings themselves, it should still cause anyone
concern that the court is usurping the role of the legislature. There is no reason for the appellate court to maintain its fog line position, and they should
instead affirm that any law violation - even a fog line violation - is sufficient
cause for a traffic stop.

170. For a comparison between Abeln and Pike, see supra notes 136-38 and ac-

companying text.
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